Introduction
Australia and South Africa share more than sporting rivalry. In legal terms there is much that has come from the common Anglo heritage. The company law regime in both countries has much in common. However, it is one matter to have common legislation it is another to have that legislation operate in the same manner given different social conditions and a different commercial 4/31 many other respects the procedure was similar in both jurisdictions. The procedure has some common goals with the current business rescue procedure in Australia (referred to here as Part 5.3A) 12 in that it is also designed to allow companies that are in financial difficulties to be saved but if this is not possible that they be wound up. However, at least in the Australian context, there was a major difficulty of the procedure which is not evident in its replacement in Part 5.3A in that official management required that the debts be paid in full within a set time. This was a major hurdle for insolvent companies.
As a result of this requirement, it was noted by the Harmer Report 13 that "official management is rarely attempted". The lack of usage of the procedure meant that there was little concern when these provisions were removed from the legislation on the commencement of Part 5.3A in 1993. 14 It is notable that the South African proposal will also remove judicial management from the legislation.
15

Development of voluntary administration
Apart for the insertion of official management provisions in the Companies Acts no further legislative development took place in the area of arrangement or compromise until the 1980s in Australia. This interest in insolvency legislation in Australia was probably sparked again from developments in the United Kingdom where the process of review of insolvency law could be traced back to the mid seventies. As Fletcher and Crabb suggest: 16 It is also worthwhile to recall that the reforms … were the product of an extended process of re-examination of the entire working of the insolvency law which began to gain in urgency in the period from 1975 No doubt the economic conditions in Australia were similarly the catalyst for the instigation of the Harmer Report. It is interesting to note in this regard that despite the delivery of the Harmer Report in 1988, it was not until the severe economic downturn of 1990 that legislation implementing the corporate reforms was introduced. In this sense the reform of the provisions relating to arrangements with creditors, with its emphasis on the continuity of the business and subsequent employment, was seen as a key feature of the response to corporate insolvency. 17 It is not clear to this author if such economic conditions may be the driver for the interest in such procedures in South Africa.
Developments since the implementation of Part 5.3A
Since its implementation in 1993, the provisions in Part 5.3A remained relatively untouched until some recent amendments passed in August 2007. Although not a large company by world standards (debts were estimated at around $A2b) it was a significant company by Australian standards. It was also the country's second largest airline and was considered an icon in the aviation industry in a country that relies heavily on air transport. There were some 15,000 employees and perhaps most significantly there was a looming Federal election.
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and Markets Advisory Committee (CAMAC) on rehabilitating large enterprises. 21 The Ansett case showed the difficulty of using Part 5.3A in relation to a larger company. One of the matters considered by CAMAC was whether the adoption of a corporate rescue model that provided for debtor in possession during the period of rescue and for entering into the procedure before a company is insolvent was required. Ultimately none of the reviews recommended that these matters be incorporated and accepted that the current provisions worked satisfactorily. It was believed that with relatively minor amendments the legislation could become flexible enough to cover larger are not yet in operation it may be some time before the predictions will be put to the test. This article deals with the Australian law as it currently exists and does not attempt to analyse the amendments not yet in force.
The aims of the procedures
The provisions dealing with corporate rehabilitation in Australia are contained in Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act. In section 435A there are objects stated which apply to the whole of the Part. These state that the business property and affairs of the company are administered in such a way that maximises the chances of the company or as much of it as possible surviving. However if that is not possible the secondary object is that the return to creditors and members is better than would have resulted from an immediate winding up. These objects have been utilised by the courts on occasion to assist in interpretation of sections in Part 5.3A. 22 It has been accepted that it is possible to use the procedure despite there being no intention to have the company or its business way of a resolution provided that the board is of the opinion that the company is insolvent or about to become insolvent. 29 Although no statistics are kept on the manner of appointment, the widely accepted view is that this is by far the most common manner in which an administrator is appointed in Australia. Secondly, the appointment may be made by a liquidator or provisional liquidator if he or 26 It is possible to speculate on why the use of rescue type provisions has become popularat least in terms of them appearing in insolvency statutes around the world. It may be that economic development has resulted in less business activity in manufacturing as well as the growth in human capital. Each of these suggests that the value in an enterprise rests less on the physical assets and more in the personal expertise and knowledge that the staff and managers bring to the firm. It is more likely that this can be retained if the corporate structure is retained. 27 It is more difficult to postulate a reason why this may be correct and a most likely explanation may be that it is not possible to predict prior to the attempt to rescue the firm whether it will be successful. Hence it may simply be a case of allowing for the rescue on the chance that it will succeed but if it does not, there are relatively few additional costs compared to an immediate liquidation. On the other hand the benefits from a successful rehabilitation are considerable and may outweigh these costs. The administration of the company is undertaken by a professional accountant who will charge not only for her or his services but also for employees, etc. the costs here will always include the time taken to learn about the firm and its operations. Thus there is no doubt that additional expense is the likely result. However it is generally seen as fundamental to the Australian regime that an independent qualified person be appointed to both run the company and report to creditors. As such there has been little support for a suggestion that Australia adopt a debtor in possession approach: see CAMAC Report http://www.camac.gov.au 14 Feb, which concluded (at 17) that "[m]ost submissions agreed that there was no compelling case for fundamental changes to Part 5.3A along the lines of the debtor in possession model".
C ANDERSON PER 2008(1)
10/31 associated with management of an insolvent company is well documented 34 and the Harmer Report recognised the fact that board will often hold out once a company approaches insolvency in the belief that there is an improvement just around the corner or that there is nothing to lose in continuing. 35 The Harmer
Report had sought to remove the incentive to continue the company by introducing a more effective regime to punish directors who allow the company to trade whilst it was insolvent whilst providing them with a means of dealing with the insolvency. Thus it was something of a carrot and stick approach in that the directors are open to liability where the company is allowed to trade on when insolvent but there is a simple cheap means of dealing with the insolvency.
The proposed South African legislation provides for a 'business rescue' 36 that may be commenced in one of three ways, by ordinary resolution of the shareholders, ordinary resolution of the board 37 or by a court order. 38 In relation to the appointment by the board of directors this has similarity to the Australian procedure. However it does not appear that the strict prohibition on insolvent trading that was introduced in Australia at the same time as the voluntary administration regime has been pursued in the South African provisions.
Although there is a reformulation of the directors' duties in the proposed new legislation it does not directly prohibit directors allowing company trading whilst the company is insolvent as is done in Australia. Thus there may not be quite the same incentive to pursue the rescue option by directors.
In relation to the appointment by the shareholders' resolution, this has echoes of the voluntary winding up procedure. This option was not adopted in Australia even though it was specifically considered by the Harmer Committee. 39 The route to the procedure via a resolution of the board of directors seems a much However it can be argued that this reflects more of a liquidation perspective of the insolvency procedure. That is, the shareholders may have no interest in an entity that is being wound up with no funds available for any stakeholders but the outside creditors, but a corporate rescue is more likely -if it is successfulto mean a continuing interest in the corporate entity from the shareholders. The approach in Australia also shows the emphasis placed upon director responsibility for the actions of the corporations. The legislation adopts a model that makes the board almost entirely responsible for the corporation with the other stakeholders 40 reduced to outsiders. 41 The Harmer Report rejected such a provision on the basis thatcompany law has reposed responsibility for the management of companies with the directors rather than the members.
42
The commencement of the procedure by the court under proposed section 134
is also a point of departure from the Australian procedure. Under the proposed section 134 an application requires that an 'insolvency event' must have occurred in relation to the company and the company must not have already entered the procedure. An insolvency event will have occurred if the company fails to satisfy a statutory demand, execution on a judgement against the company is returned unsatisfied or the court is satisfied the company is unable to pay its debts. 43 If such an event has occurred then any affected person may apply to the court. An affected person is proposed to be a shareholder, creditor, 
13/31
What is of interest is that under the proposed section 132(3) in the South African regime is the fact that the company must appoint a supervisor within five business days after filing the resolution that the company begin the business rescue procedure. This suggests that the company may be within the business rescue regime without the control of the company being with the supervisor. It therefore provides the opportunity for something of a gap to be created of up to five business days during which the supervisor is not in place.
It is unclear as to the impact of the decisions of the board of directors during this time. Under proposed section 143 it is the supervisor who is responsible to supervise and advise the management whilst the business rescue is in place but the ability to retrospectively do this (where the appointment is made five days later) is unclear. It may be desirable to resolve this by requiring the appointment of the supervisor to coincide with the commencement of the procedure.
Supervision during the rescue process
As with all rescue procedures there needs to be a period of investigation of the corporations business prior to making any decision as to the future. This period may be longer as in the North American models of rescue or shorter as in the Anglo-Australian models. There are various arguments for and against the shorter time frames adopted in Australia. 53 The Harmer Report was clearly of the view that a short time frame was necessary in order to prevent abuse by the this is consistent with the other aspects of the scheme as well.
Initial meetings
There are other similarities between the systems as well in that there is an given by a vote of the employees or the court. 66 It is clear that there has been concern as to the employees' position in the South African proposal. This is understandable as it has been the Australian experience that at times the employees' position in the decision-making process has been one of disadvantage. 67 The South African approach is to elevate the employees in terms of rights being given under proposed section 147 as regards being consulted on the development of the rescue plan and to propose an alternative plan. Further protection is granted to employees through the proposed section 139. 68 The additional concern as regards employees reflects the different social structures and conditions that exist in each jurisdiction rather than any fundamental difference in the underlying approach. 
Moratoriums
In any corporate rescue system there needs to be a circuit breaker that provides a breathing space whilst a consideration is given to the prospect of saving the company.
In Australia as part of the moratorium provisions there is during the period of the administration a general prohibition on the rights of owners or lessors of property that is in the possession of the company. 77 Because a major aim of the administration period is to provide the company with the opportunity to consider a rescue, the appointment of an administrator has a significant impact on the rights of unsecured creditors and this is manifested in a number of ways.
Thus during the administration:
73 The ending of the proceedings would also presumably terminate the right under proposed s 144(2) to apply to the court for winding up as this is operative "during business proceedings". 
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• court proceedings against the company are automatically stayed without the written consent of the administrator or the court;
78
• the execution process if started cannot continue; 79 and
• any other attempt to enforce a judgement is barred.
80
The Harmer Report 81 recommended the moratorium apparently on the basis of promoting an orderly dealing with a company's affairs. 82 The principle which justified such a limited interference was considered to be based upon thepromotion of an orderly dealing with a company's affairs so as to enable a more beneficial realisation of assets on winding up or possibly the rehabilitation of the business of the company.
As with other creditors, those who are secured by way of a charge may face restrictions on their rights once an administrator is appointed. The Harmer Report 83 argued that there were three principles that justified the interference.
These were:
• promotion of an orderly dealing with the company's affairs;
• recognition of the debtor's interests in the assets that are subject to the security; and
• recognition that the particular asset that is subject of the security may be necessary for any reorganisation to be successful.
The basic prohibition 84 is against a person enforcing a charge on the property of the company during the period of the administration. This is subject to a One secured creditor who can assert rights despite the appointment of an administrator is one having a charge over the whole or substantially the whole of the assets of the company. 87 Potentially the exception 88 may thwart the administration process as these secured creditors could generally act to appoint their own receiver. This has not proven to be the case.
Under the South African proposal there is a general moratorium provided for in the proposed section 136. This provides that no legal proceeding against the company or in relation to its property may be commenced or proceeded with without the consent of the supervisor or the leave of the court. 89 The South
African proposal also provides that the company may only dispose of property in the ordinary course of business or in a bona fide transaction as approved by the supervisor. 90 The subsection does also allow for the disposal as part of the implementation of the business rescue plan once it has been approved under section 155. Whilst this has similarities to the Australian provisions it does highlight one very significant difference between the two systems. The South 
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Compliance with any business rescue plan 91 that has been adopted under the proceedings. The Australian procedure has two distinct phases. The first is the voluntary administration procedure which has significant moratorium attached to it for all creditors and owners of property. This is the moratorium as described above. However once a rescue plan has been adopted by the second meeting of creditors, those provisions imposing the general moratorium come to an end. 92 The operation of the rescue plan or deed of company arrangement as it is termed in the legislation, results generally in only unsecured creditors being bound. The secured creditors and owners of property in the possession of the company are at that time free to enforce their security or recover their property in accordance with their pre-appointment rights unless they have voted in favour of the deed or there is an order of the court. 93 The proposed South African procedure appears to bind the rights of all persons in relation to the rights in respect of the company's property without the approval of the supervisor, as part of the rescue plan or an order of the court.
94
There is provision for rights to be exercised in accordance with an "agreement made in the ordinary course of the company's business" 95 but it is unclear what that may be intended to cover as it seems to suggest an agreement made after the appointment of the supervisor for if not it would seem to allow the enforcement against the property of the company at any time. Where the company does dispose of property that is either secured or owned by another, the company is required to pay the amount received to the owner or secured creditor or provide security.
As well as the moratorium that exists in the South African proposals any supplier to the company of products considered essential to the conduct of the business must continue the supply unless there is an agreement in relation to 91 This is required under proposed s 155(7). It is not clear from that provision when that notice does need to be filed as it is when the plan has been 'implemented'. This may mean once it is in place or it may imply that the plan has been satisfactorily completed. The author could find no illumination on this point. 
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other terms or there is a court order. 96 There is no such provision in the Australian procedure so that it appears this will make the procedure more debtor friendly than the equivalent Australian procedure. Further as part of the protection of employees theme that runs through the South African procedure, the employees continue to be employed on the same terms and conditions 97 except to the extent that:
• changes occur in the ordinary course of attrition;
• an approved business rescue plan provides otherwise; or
• the employees and the company agree to different terms and conditions that benefit the company.
Again this provides much more protection than appears under the Australian provisions. In the Patrick's case in Australia, 98 the High Court made it clear that a fundamental aspect of the administrator's task was to operate the company as he or she saw fit and that accordingly even where there may was possible breaches of industrial legislation, it was not prepared to order that employees must be retained by the company during a voluntary administration.
Role of supervisors
In Australia the administrator in the voluntary administration procedure is given effectively total control over the company. The administrator has broad powers in terms of management as the power of other officers is suspended. 24/31 company arrangement or to simply return the company to its previous condition at a second meeting of creditors. 105 The third option is not adopted in most cases so the creditors will be deciding the matter as either liquidation or a deed.
The system therefore relies upon the creditors being able to make the correct decision as regards the future of the company and in this respect the information provided by the administrator is critical.
106
It is interesting that a very pragmatic approach to the voting is adopted in Australia despite the decision being critical to the procedure. There is a division of the votes into class and number but there is no division based upon priority.
Hence there is no division into classes as such. 107 This results in a relatively quick decision. The method of voting is not specified clearly in the legislation in relation to voluntary administration and it is only in the Corporations
Regulations made pursuant to the Corporations Act that the method is spelt out. 108 The regulations provide for a vote to be put to the meeting with a simple majority in number and in value required to pass a resolution. If there is a split by way of different voting between the two groups, the chair of the meeting (who must be the administrator) has a casting vote. Where the casting vote is used, there are rights of appeal to affected parties. 109 The aim as with many of the provisions in this Part appears to be to have a quick decision with minimum formalities and that if stakeholders feel aggrieved they should apply to the court for an adjudication and remedy.
The South African proposal is for a meeting of the creditors "and any other holder of a voting interest" 110 to consider the rescue plan. A voting interest is effectively defined under proposed sections 148(4) to (7) 
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Another feature of the South African proposal which is not allowed for under the Australian provisions is the option of the supervisor to seek a vote to prepare a revised plan. 114 Further, this may be done through a vote by the holders of any voting interests at the meeting. 115 There is no specification as to how this vote is to be taken and hence it does not appear to require the approval of 75% of "independent creditors' voting interests" in the manner that the plan approval does.
In Australia there is an emphasis on having the company wound up when the deed is rejected by the creditors. 116 Although it is possible for the meeting to be adjourned 117 there are only three alternatives provided for at the meeting of creditors and none of those specifically involve an extension of time to consider a revised rescue plan. As a result it may be expected that the South African approach may result in more plans being adopted than is the case in Australia.
It may result in more strategic behaviour though, by supervisors in conjunction with company management to delay liquidation. Such a problem could be overcome if there is a strong court reaction to such situations and the regulation of the supervisors by the registration authority is effective.
Conclusions
This article has made some comparisons between the Australian corporate rescue provisions and those proposed to be adopted in South Africa in the That is not to suggest that the Australian provisions ignore employees completely but in South Africa it is proposed that their involvement will be more direct and are recognised throughout as being in a special position vis a vis other creditors. On the other hand there appears to be less concern in South Africa with the position of secured creditors than is evident in the Australian provisions. Concern about the support for the procedure by institutional lenders is possibly at the core of the stronger position of secured creditors in the Australian legislation.
Second, the proposed South African provisions do not facilitate transition to winding up in the same manner as the Australian provisions. There is within the South African proposal a genuine attempt to give the company every chance at developing a rescue plan by allowing for alternative proposals to be developed.
There is no direct transition after the rejection of a plan to winding up as there is in Australia. The Australian provisions are structured more to provide for liquidation as a direct alternative for creditors rather than proposals for an alternative plan. This is also reflected in the style of reports provided to the creditors. The South African proposals do not divide the procedure clearly into a decision-making stage and the period whilst the company is operating under the rescue plan. The Australian provisions provide clearly for a break between a period where the creditors have yet to make a choice about the company's future and the period once a plan (or deed of company arrangement) has been adopted. The legislation clearly divides these periods in terms of major issues such as the moratorium the power of the administrator and so on.
In many respects the South African model of rescue as proposed does cover many similar areas as identified in the Australian legislation and these include aspects of the supervisors position, the periods for holding meetings and so on.
There are sufficient similarities to suggest that much will be common in the experience if they are adopted into the legislation. However differences will remain and it will be interesting to review the procedure in the coming years to see if the scheme is as popular as it is in Australia. 
